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From the Ashes: Jus Post Bellum and the Emergence of Kosovo

When the subject of war arises today, the conversation inevitably turns to the continuing
conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. As these two conflicts rage into their fourth and sixth years
respectively and the situation on the ground seems to be deteriorating, our national conversation
seems primarily concerned with a timeline for exit.
The just war tradition is not immune to this conversation. In direct response to these
conflicts, scholars have, for the first time, developed criteria for justly ending and exiting a war.
Unfortunately, the application of these criteria has thus far been limited to Iraq and Afghanistan.
While these conflicts have served as a catalyst for this advance in just war theory, and elected
officials should be mindful of exiting these wars justly, the complex and ongoing nature of these
conflicts makes them difficult test cases for jus post bellum criteria. For a more straightforward
and developed case, I turn to the conflict in the former Yugoslavian province of Kosovo and the
eight years of peace and reconstruction that have followed. Building on the work of the
trailblazers of this field, I will show how jus post bellum principles have transferred into tangible
results in the real life construction of a lasting peace in Kosovo.

The Construction of Jus post bellum
In 1994, Michael Schuck began the current conversation by defining three jus post bellum
principles: repentance, honorable surrender, and restoration.1 In practical terms, Schuck’s
principles fall short of being the well-honed criteria of a complete jus post bellum. They define
an atmosphere of surrender and a posture of victory, but they do not define absolute criteria for
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the just ending of a war.2 However, building on Schuck’s model and the just war theories of
Michael Walzer, Brian Orend has laid out a more complete list of seven jus post bellum
principles: punishment #1 (rights offenses), punishment #2 (wartime offenses), compensation,
proportionality and publicity, rights vindication, discrimination, and rehabilitation.3 These seven
principles are the most complete and most widely accepted jus post bellum criteria to date.
One of the first steps toward building a lasting peace is to acknowledge the ills that
brought us to war, acknowledge our missteps within the war itself, then atone for both through
punishment and compensation. Orend’s two punishment principles reflect the need to punish the
offenses that led to war (violations of jus ad bellum, generally levied on the defeated leadership)
and the offenses committed as part of the conflict (violations of jus in bello, levied on soldiers of
both sides). The principle of compensation states that the victor may mandate financial
reparations for the war, but that these reparations are subject to both proportionality and
discrimination.
Just as proper punishment is a necessary means to a lasting peace, there is also a need for
healing and rebuilding. Proportionality and publicity states that a peace settlement ought to be
measured and reasonable, and that it should be publicly pronounced. The jus ad bellum principle
of comparative justice requires that the injustice the war aims at abating be greater than the
injustice and suffering created by the war. Certainly, this principle must hold for the just ending
of a war as well, especially if our aim is to create a lasting peace. Schuck’s principle of
honorable surrender states that, “Victors would be expected to construct the terms and method of
surrender in a manner that protects the fundamental rights of the vanquished.”4 Orend follows
that a peace settlement should be “measured and reasonable” and that the peace process should
be publicly proclaimed.
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Rights vindication states that conflict should end when the victor secures the basic rights
whose violation caused the conflict in the first place. It defines the end of a conflict, restrains the
victor from exacting revenge, establishes rights for all parties, and works toward a lasting peace.
For Orend, it should be the “main substantive goal of any peace settlement.”5 Furthermore,
when developing a peace settlement, one must be able to separate the wartime actions of a
government or military from the innocent civilians who have not offended. The principle of
discrimination reflects the jus in bello principle of the same name, marking the distinction
between combatants and noncombatants and between leaders and soldiers. Settlement should not
unduly punish the civilian population for the sins of their government. Rights vindication and
discrimination together render excessive postwar sanctions unjust.
Finally, if a lasting and just peace is to be obtained, the just end of a war must include an
effort to rehabilitate all war torn nations. To this end, Schuck states, “as a minimal requirement,
victors must return to the field of battle and help remove the instruments of war.”6 He
specifically cites landmines as indiscriminate tools of war that should be removed for the safety
of the community and the restoration of peace. Unexploded cluster bombs and depleted uranium
shell casings are two other tools of war that would fall in this category.7 However, there is more
to restoration than removing the instruments of war. Restoration involves an effort to return to a
peaceful existence. While some might aim at returning to life before the conflict, according to
Kenneth Himes, “Literal restoration of the state of affairs prior to a war is not possible. It is also
not desirable since the prior state of affairs is what gave rise to conflict.”8 Therefore, we must
seek a balance. We must make all efforts to restore what we can while repairing the conditions
that led to war. Orend’s principle of rehabilitation aims at building or rebuilding the institutions
that were destroyed by the war. Orend goes so far as to say, “the postwar environment provides a
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promising opportunity to reform decrepit institutions in an aggressor regime.”9 In other words,
we should use the opportunity of post war reconstruction to reform a corrupt or otherwise
decrepit government. This is not carte blanche approval to reform governments according to our
personal politics or philosophy, but rather an opportunity to remove unjust institutions in order to
build a more just and lasting peace.

A Short History of Kosovo
Orend acknowledges that his jus post bellum criteria are developed in light of a
conventional interstate war, but notes that “with modifications, the principles developed … no
doubt serve as a compelling moral blueprint for application to these other cases,” among which
he lists Kosovo.10 I would argue that Orend’s principles can be applied to Kosovo without
modification, simply by acknowledging that the ethnic cleansing campaign under Slobodan
Milosevic made the Serbian government an unjust aggressor by any estimation, and warranted
intervention by the international community.
That is not to say that the Kosovo conflict from start to finish is a just war, as we will
see.11 That said, Kosovo serves as a good case study because of its current stage in post war
development and its relatively public and straightforward post war process. After eight years of
establishing a stand-alone government, rebuilding infrastructure, and developing an economy,
Kosovo now stands on the brink of independence from Serbia. While Russia is currently
blocking this motion in the U.N. Security Council, clouding Kosovo’s future in uncertainty, the
process to this point has been relatively free of confusion, probably owing to the atrocities of
Serbia’s ethnic cleansing campaign and Kosovo’s 90% Albanian population, which gives it a
strong mandate for self-rule, despite its long history as a part of Serbia.
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Serbia’s claim on Kosovo goes back to the 14th century, when Serbia fell to the Ottoman
Turks, beginning 500 years of Ottoman rule of the Balkans. Serbia lost to the Turks in the
legendary Battle at Kosovo in 1389. According to legend, Serbian Knez (Serbian for Czar)
Lazar was by the prophet Elijiah on the eve of the battle, and given a choice: he could either have
an empire on earth or and eternal kingdom in heaven. Lazar chose the heavenly kingdom and
lost the battle and his life after being betrayed in battle by local Serbian Lord Vuk Brankovic.
However, Milos Obilic, a loyal servant of Lazar, feigned betrayal of the Serbs in order to get
inside the tent of Turkish Sultan Murad. The ruse was successful and Olilic assassinated Sultan
Murad, preserving Serbian dignity, even in defeat. Embedded in this legend was a redemptive
promise that Lazar had made the right choice and someday Serbia would rise again as a great
nation. This battle and the land of Kosovo itself continue to stand as a symbol of Serbian
nationality today, ingrained in the history of the Serbian people, despite the vast Albanian
majority in the region. According to Balkan historian Tim Judah, “In all European history it is
impossible to find any comparison with the effect of [the battle of] Kosovo on the Serbian
national psyche.”12
In 1918, Serbia, including Kosovo, formed with its neighbors The Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes, the nation which would in 1929 become known as Yugoslavia, literally the
“Kingdom of South Slavs.”13 Albanians are not Slavic, and therefore held fewer rights in
Yugoslavia from the start. When Josep Broz Tito and the communist party took power in
Yugoslavia following World War II, he became a unifying force for Yugoslavia, uniting the
republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Slovenia
under one communist state. In the Yugoslavian constitution, these republics were identified as
“nations” and granted the right to secede from Yugoslavia at will. Albanians in Kosovo and were
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recognized as a “nationality,” as was the Hungarian majority in the Serbian province of
Vojvodina. This diminished status denied these “nationalities” representation in the Yugoslav

assembly and precluded them from seceding from Yugoslavia.
Following Tito’s death in 1981, Yugoslavia slowly began to disassemble. The Yugoslav
economy faltered in the 1980s, and the nations within Yugoslavia began to quarrel over how to
proceed. During this time, Serbian nationalists began to call for a Greater Serbia to finally rise
after 600 years and take over the Balkan region. On April 24th,1987, a little known Serbian
bureaucrat named Slobodan Milosevic made a name for himself by giving a speech at Kosovo
Polje (the field of blackbirds), the site of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Milosevic was
responding to Serbian complaints of oppression by the Albanian majority and police brutality in
the region.14 Rather than ease the tension of the situation, he incited the crowd by asserting, “No
should dare to beat you!”15 According to Miroslav Slojevic, the Kosovo Serb leader at the time,
“This sentence enthroned him as [Knez]”16 He implored the Serbians not to flee in Kosovo for
Serbia proper, claiming, “Yugoslavia does not exist without Kosovo...Yugoslavia and Serbia are
not going to give up Kosovo!”17 The speech ignited riots and Milosevic rose to power on a wave
of Serbian nationalism. He quickly became President of Serbia and eventually the President of
Yugoslavia. In 1989, on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo, Milosevic stood at
Kosovo Polje again and further stoked the flames of Serbian nationalism. To understand the
power of this moment, it should be noted that Serbs celebrated Knez Lazar as a Christ-like
figure. His death at Kosovo marked the beginning of 500 years under Turkish (Muslim) rule. The
rise of Serbia again in the 20th century was the resurrection of a people. When Milosevic rose to
power, he assumed the role of Serbia’s redeemer.18 In 1989, Milosevic spoke of the battle of
Kosovo as if were still being fought:
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Let him who fails to join the battle of Kosovo
Fail in all he undertakes in his fields
Let his fields go barren of the good golden wheat
Let his vineyard remain without vines or grapes…19
In response, the Serbian crowd chanted, “Tsar Lazar, you were unfortunate, not to have Slobo on
your side.”20
This upwelling of Serbian nationalism marked the end of Yugoslavia. On June 25th, 1990
Slovenia became the first republic to secede from Yugoslavia. A ten day conflict followed, but
since the secession was in accordance with the Yugoslavian Constitution and Slovenia was a
generally homogeneous Slovene population, it was allowed to secede without much of a fight.
The secession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Croatia, however, though also in accordance with
the Yugoslavian Constitution, led to civil wars. The Serbian populations of both of those
republics, supported by Milosevic and the Yugoslav national army, fought to remain unified with
Serbia, while the Bosnian and Croatian populations favored autonomy. While Serbia was mired
in these conflicts, Macedonia – who did not have a significant Serb population – was allowed to
secede without the military conflict. This left Montenegro and Serbia – including Kosovo and
Vojvodina – as the sole heirs to a rump Yugoslavia.21

In Kosovo, most historians agree that Milosevic’s Battle of Kosovo speech was a turning
point in Serbian-Albanian relations. Under Tito, Kosovo Albanians had been gradually given
greater and greater rights, despite never being recognized as a “nation” in the Yugoslav
Constitution. Between 1968 and 1974, Kosovo gained the authority to determine their own laws,
so long as those laws did not violate the Serbian and Yugoslav Constitutions. In 1974, the
Yugoslav constitution was rewritten, and Kosovo was granted representation in the Yugoslav
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Assembly. Under Tito, Albanians were granted Albanian language schools and in 1970, the
University of Pristina became the first Albanian language University in Yugoslavia. Following
Tito’s death, however, Yugoslavia began stripping these rights from the Albanians. Serbia
dissolved the Kosovo local and federal governments. They also converted all schools, including
the University of Pristina, from Albanian to Serbian language. Milosevic’s Battle of Kosovo
speech only solidified these moves as a part of Serbian nationalism, and heightened animosity
between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo.
Many in Kosovo believed that the 1995 Dayton Accords, the peace agreement brokered
as an end to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, would include a resolution for Kosovo as well.
Kosovars had largely used non-violent means to agitate for their right to sovereignty since the
late 1980s. They formed nonviolent protests at the University of Pristina.22 They withdrew from
Serbian schools and established an Albanian language school system in mosques and homes.
Ibrahim Rugova, the elected president of Kosovo, set up a refugee government in Germany
whose main functions were to present the Kosovar cause to the international world and to draw
financial support for Albanian schools and other functions from Kosovars living overseas.23
Rugova, himself, was a firm believer that the Dayton Accords would provide a final solution to
the plight of Kosovo, and urged his people to wait on a peaceful solution.
When the Dayton Accords failed to recognize the plight of Kosovo, nonviolence gave
way to violence and the Kosovo Liberation Army rose up to demand independence from Serbia
in 1998. Serbia responded with the force of their full military to put down the rebellion and used
the violence to push the cause of Serbian nationalism in Kosovo through a campaign of ethnic
cleansing. The Serb military, paramilitary groups, and even Serb civilians drove Albanians from
their homes. At the minimum, Kosovars were put on trains and in caravans and sent to the border
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though in many cases, they were simply killed. Albanian homes were looted by their Serbian
neighbors then often burned to the ground. All told, almost 850,000 Kosovars were either
deported or fled Kosovo into Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and thousands more were
killed.24
The initial response of the international community to the situation in Kosovo was to try
to bring about peace through a Dayton style conference in Rambouillet, France. This agreement
ultimately fell apart when Milosevic began making sweeping changes to it on the eve of its
signing. Thirty-four hours after the Rambouillet Accord failed, on March 24, 1999, NATO began
an aerial bombing campaign. It is important to note, however, that it was not the United Nations
who began the air bombardment, but NATO. In consistency with the current UN Security
Council standoff, in which Russia is using its veto to support Serbia, Russia also vetoed UN
military action in 1999. According to Judah, however, Russia did give implicit support to the
campaign in backdoor meetings, agreeing that they would not support Serbia militarily if NATO
attacked.25 After the conflict concluded, the United Nations assumed authority for post war
reconstruction, though NATO remains the primary security force in Kosovo, under the auspices
of the UN.

Punishment and Retribution
Although the NATO campaign lasted only 78 days, anyone could see that the post war
resolution of the Kosovo situation was going to be neither straightforward nor quick. The
conflicting territorial claims of Albanians and Serbs were further complicated by a long history
of animosity between these two peoples. This discord came to a peak with the Serbian ethnic
cleansing of Albanians during the conflict. The Albanians however were not free of blame either,
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because their return under NATO protection prompted retaliation in kind, and thousands of Serbs
were forced to flee their homes as well. This response brings us to the first category of jus post
bellum, punishment, which ought to be leveled on all sides of the conflict, to include the original
aggressor, the victim, and the vindicator nations that have come to the aid of the victim. Thus
war crimes tribunals ought to be established by a neutral international authority (preferably
today, by the United Nations) to seek just punishment for injustices before and during the war,
thus fulfilling the principles of just punishment. The establishment of the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague, Netherlands, is one of the best
historical examples of this principle. Its self-described mission is:
•

to bring to justice persons allegedly responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law

•

to render justice to the victims

•

to deter further crimes

•

to contribute to the restoration of peace by holding accountable persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law26

The tribunal is an international body of 28 judges from 26 countries, ensuring its neutrality. As
of the end of 2006, the ICTY had charged 161 persons for war crimes, having concluded
proceedings on 94 of the accused.27 Only six indicted persons remained at large.28 Of the trials
that have concluded, there have been convictions against both Serbian military and political
leaders and KLA leadership. Certainly, the most noteworthy trial of the ICTY is the prosecution
of Slobodan Milosevic himself. The ICTY accused Milosevic for war crimes committed in
Kosovo, Bosnia, and Croatia. His trial began on February 12, 2002 and lasted four years.
Milosevic died in prison just before the trial was set to conclude.
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The companion of punishment is compensation, which Orend describes as “financial
restitution” for destruction caused by the war.29 There was clearly great destruction during the
Kosovo conflict. Homes on both sides were looted and burned. Churches and mosques were
destroyed. Yet, the Kosovars have never asked for financial reparations from Serbia. With the
end of the conflict in 1999, the Kosovars set out to begin rebuilding without Serbian restitution.
Today, Kosovo stands as a region in the midst of vast reconstruction. In the years directly
following the conflict, international aid flowed into Kosovo. Despite the physical destruction and
the nascent economy, international aid assured that the basic needs of individuals were met.
Furthermore, for those with an education, particularly those who could speak English, good jobs
were available with the UN and with the NGOs that followed. This, combined with an abounding
hope in the future (Kosovars, for the first time, saw independence as a forthcoming reality),
drove a construction boom throughout Kosovo. In the early years after the war, people and
companies were grabbing plots of land and building as much and as fast as they could. The
results of this can be seen today, for most of the buildings are less than 10 years old. There was
never a call for financial compensation for the war because the Kosovars rebuilt using
international aid money instead.
Serbians in Kosovo, on the other hand, emerged from the conflict empty handed. Forced
off their land and out of their homes in the final stages of the conflict, those who still live in
Kosovo generally fall in the category of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees in their
own country, having fled to enclaves throughout Kosovo or north to the still predominantly Serb
municipalities of Zubin Potok, Zvecar, and Lepoavic. Often the lands and homes they owned
remain deserted. The Albanians preferred to build new, rather than occupy the space of their
former neighbors turned enemies. The Serbians, recognizing that it will be a long time before
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they could live peacefully in their former homes have begun to ask for compensation for the lost
property. The response has been mixed. Some Serbs have been able to sell off their lost property,
while others are hoping that a final solution on Kosovo’s status will bring forth a resolution on
compensation for their property.
Orend’s use of the principle of compensation was limited to financial compensation for
losses. To Kosovo Albanians, however, the loss of property is minimal when compared to the
loss of rights such as autonomy, freedom, and self-determination. When considering
compensation, we must recognize that the ultimate solution may not be simply monetary. For the
Kosovars, the only compensation they desire is independence.

Development of Peace
As this article goes to press, independence is not yet a reality, though it appears to be
very close. In the summer of 2007, after 14 rounds of talks between Serbia and the Kosovar
leadership, former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari developed a plan that called for
independence, but under the protection and supervision of the European Union. Serbia has
rejected any plan that includes Kosovar independence and Russia has blocked the Ahtisaari plan
in the UN Security Council, claiming it will not support any plan that is not supported fully by
Serbia. Many believe that Kosovo is being caught in an international power struggle, for Russia
has made many recent moves to reestablish territorial control of Eastern Europe. Others have
noted the similarity between the Kosovar struggle and the efforts of Chechnya to secede from
Russia. The rejection of the Ahtisaari plan was followed by what was billed as 120 final days of
negotiations involving a “Troika” of negotiators from the EU, the US, and Russia. The US has
already suggested that if a resolution is not reached through this round of talks, independence
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may have to come outside of the UN.30 The EU has generally agreed with that assessment, but
some individual European nations are not in complete agreement with that stance, out of fear that
independence could spark separatist movements elsewhere in the world. Kosovo Albanians for
their part have already begun to plan for unilateral independence for early of 2008. 31 In attempt
to avoid unilateral independence the some have proposed a solution involving Serbia being
placed on a fast track to entry in the EU in exchange for granting Kosovo independence. The EU
would also require Serbia to transfer Bosnian Serb wartime general Ratko Mladic to the ICTY
on genocide charges.32
In seeking a just peace, we must be assured that any plan for independence upholds the
principles of publicity and proportionality. All of the proposals on the table have been readily
available to the public. While the situation in Kosovo has only recently reentered Western
newspapers, because independence seems on the horizon, it is difficult to find a person in
Kosovo who does not have intimate and detailed knowledge of the current situation. The
Kosovars have demanded nothing less than full disclosure of the steps toward independence.
As for proportionality, we must recognize that independence is a severe conclusion to the
Kosovo conflict and due care must be taken that such a step is proportional and necessary. Given
the history of oppression between the Serbs and Albanians, it may be the only just solution.
Furthermore, the 90% majority of Albanians in Kosovo makes a strong case for autonomy and
self-determination. Finally, in the eight years since the conflict ended, Kosovo has essentially
acted independently of Serbia. While this alone is not justification for secession, it indicates, that
independence, under protection and supervision of an international authority like the UN or the
EU, may be a successful way to maintain peace and uphold the rights of all.
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In an independent Kosovo, the rights of the Serbs who remain in Kosovo (a mere 5% of
the population) are the most in jeopardy. Despite their history as an aggressor state, the
principles of rights vindication, discrimination, and proportionality all demand protection for the
rights of the individual Serbs in Kosovo. The largest hurdle in restoring Kosovo after the conflict
was the need to return refugees to their homes. However, this effort also marks one of the
greatest failures of Kosovo’s reconstruction. The return of Albanian refugees sparked a
retaliation campaign that drove most of the Serbs out of their homes. For a jus post bellum, every
effort ought to have been made to avoid this type of violence. Moreover, eight years later, many
of those Serbs are still internally displaced, living either in the Serbian municipalities or in small
Serbian enclaves within Albanian municipalities. Serbian authorities also estimate that 200,000
Kosovar Serbs are living outside of Kosovo. While many of these Serbs have no intention of
returning to Kosovo, the fact that so many were displaced in the first place, coupled with the fact
that so many remain displaced today, is a lasting indication of the failure of the principle of
rights vindication.
In contrast to these early failures, the Albanian majority, under UN and EU pressure, has
worked toward Serbian inclusion in recent years. Currently, Serbian language schools are funded
by the Serbian government. Structures are already in place to bring these schools under the
Kosovar government while maintaining them in the Serbian language. Moreover, as part of the
Ahtisaari plan, the European Union would retain a certain amount of supervision authority in the
initial Kosovo government, with a primary goal of upholding minority rights.
Despite all efforts, Serbs in Kosovo remain fearful of independence. Those who remain
in Kosovo generally live in enclaves away from their homes in fear of revenge and hate crimes
that might be aimed towards them by their former neighbors. The northern Kosovo city of
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Mitrovica is a particular hotbed of this type of fear and hatred. Once a bustling mining town, the
city is now divided along ethnic lines by the Ibar River that runs down its center, with the Serbs
in the North and the Albanians in the south. A small “confidence zone”, including the main
bridge across the river, is secured by NATO troops. The ethic division is acute. License plates on
the Northern side are generally Serbian, while cars on the opposite bank have UN Mission in
Kosovo (UNMIK) issued plates. The few private cars that cross the bridge, often doing the peace
building work of NGOs, generally have to be registered in a neutral country like Macedonia.
Trepcia mine, which once supported 20,000 employees directly and another 10,000 in
supplemental industries, has been closed since the conflict, because half of its facilities lie in the
Serbian part of the municipality and the other half lie in the Albanian portion. Finally, in an
ironic reality, the Albanian cemetery is in the Northern part of the city, while the Serbian
cemetery is in the south. Funerals require a NATO escort.
Clearly, such deeply rooted hatred will not simply go away if independence is granted.
On the contrary, many have feared violent backlashes by the Serb minority in that event. Even if
violence is avoided, hatred runs deep and will take a long and dedicated effort to overcome. The
UN has enlisted the help of NGOs to begin to heal the divide. Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in
Mitrovica is targeting the youth, in an attempt to stem the hatred before the seeds take root. This
youth strategy is helped by the fact that more than 50% of Kosovo’s population is younger that
26, the youngest population in all of Europe.33 As part of the Youth Securing the Future Project,
CRS has set up a City Wide Youth Council where Serb and Albanian students come together
with two goals. First is to develop interethnic relationships and build interethnic understanding
and second is to advocate for better public services on both sides of the Ibar River.
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Complete post war success in Kosovo will still require a great effort by all parties
involved. Despite early failures, the foundation laid in recent years reflects a strong effort to
develop a lasting peace through the principles of proportionality, publicity, discrimination, and
an upholding of rights. Even as a just peace settlement is being determined, and punishment and
retributions are being accorded, final attention must also be paid to the third pillar of jus post
bellum, the reconstruction of economic, political, and social structures.

Rehabilitation
In Kosovo, rehabilitation is a broad principle that needs to incorporate everything from
establishing a democratic government and modern economic system to improving the electrical
grid and establishing a proper school system. If Kosovo is to avoid a relapse into war, the most
important step is assuring that the basic needs of the people are met. To this end, the US
government spent $238 million on non-military aid to Kosovo between 1999 and 2004, and the
EU spent nearly three times this amount.34 This money went to establishing basic social,
economic, and political structures and repairing those that had been weakened or destroyed by
the conflict and its preceding years.
The primary concerns of rehabilitation have been government and the local economy.
With the help of international expertise, UNMIK helped to establish the local “rule of law”
including the creation of a local judiciary and a just election process. When businesses had
trouble starting up because of a lack of capital, USAID, the US state department arm that
manages all foreign aid, helped to establish the local banking system, allowing businesses the
credit they needed.
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On a more fundamental level, Kosovo is still plagued with blackouts due to a decrepit
electrical grid, an insufficient billing system, and customers unable to pay their electric bill. In
response, USAID helped to construct a modern metering system to help with the billing and
funding problems and is currently funding a new, cleaner, more efficient, and more reliable
energy plant, that will also meet EU environmental standards.
Despite all efforts so far, problems persist. There is vast unemployment and poverty in
Kosovo, with 530 registered unemployed persons for every vacancy and 37% of the population
living on less than $2 per day.35 Many attribute the lingering status question with many of
Kosovo’s recent economic woes. Few outside corporations are willing to invest in Kosovo until
its status is determined and international organizations have been slowly withdrawing from
Kosovo. Many local employers, like the closed Trepcia mine, also await a final status decision
before they can operate. Even established solutions have their limits. The newly established
national bank, though bought out by a larger German bank with more resources, has been
reluctant to grant credit to individuals and small businesses until status is resolved. Without
credit, many would be entrepreneurs, homeowners, farmers, etc. cannot expand their enterprises
and thereby expand the economy.
Clearly, rehabilitation is incomplete in Kosovo. Rehabilitation efforts of the past eight
years have gone a long way to creating a lasting peace in Kosovo, but there is still work to be
done. When independence is finally resolved, the economy will still require tremendous foreign
aid and the fledgling government will continue to need guidance from the European Union.
Finally, tremendous work still needs to be done to bring final resolution and peace between the
Kosovars and the Serbs.
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There have been remarkable successes and glaring failures in the post war process of
Kosovo. The principles of punishment have been exacted thoroughly and justly by the
International War Crimes Tribunal of the former Yugoslavia. The process of deciding
independence has been both proportional and public, even as it awaits a final outcome. The
rights of Albanians have been vindicated, and great efforts have been made to protect the rights
of Serbs, despite the failures in this regard at the end of the conflict. Tremendous time, energy,
and money have also been exacted at encouraging peace and communication on both sides.
Finally, international aid has helped to rehabilitate the most basic structures of government and
economy.
Jus post bellum criteria have been established to ensure the just ending of a war. Using
Kosovo as a test case allows us to see their utility in a relatively straightforward set of
circumstances. In Kosovo, we see the glaring failure of rights vindication when the Albanians
returned to their homes, and the repercussions that failure continues to have on the peace process
and the healing of relations between Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo. Moreover, we see the
overwhelming success of the principle of just punishment and the continued efforts of
rehabilitation and can seek to use Kosovo as a positive example for these principles.
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